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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
International institutions greatly influence the political economy of states. Through 
international institutions the international community has played a major role in the 
Palestinian territories, particularly since the Oslo Accords in 1993, in formulating a 
neoliberal framework for political and economic development for a potential Palestinian 
state and economy. For purposes of this paper, institutions are defined as “persistent and 
connected sets of rules and practice that prescribe roles, certain activity, and shape the 
expectations of actors.”1 Institutions may include organizations, bureaucratic regimes, 
treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states accept as binding. The balance 
of power in the international system is an example of an institution.
2
 This thesis analyzes 
the role of international institutions in the concept and planning for a potential Palestinian 
state. 
 The institutional norms and logic of every major development and financial 
organization working in the Palestinian territories agrees that state formation in Palestine 
should be based on neoliberal political and economic theory. The actors in this scheme 
include the major international development and financial organizations (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Quartet (United Nations (UN), US, European Union (EU), Russia), various UN agencies, 
the European Commission (EC), etc.) along with individual state-based international 
                                                 
1
 Peter Hass, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International 
Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 4 – 5. 
2
 Ibid, 4 – 5.  
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development agencies (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), etc.). While the activities of each 
organization take on different priorities and emphasis, all political and economic 
development projects support the configuration of social forces toward the consolidation 
of neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestine.  
  The conceptualization of a Palestinian state and a state formation process should 
not be misconstrued in conventional terms, meaning monopolization over the use of 
violence, coercion, institutions, and territory.
3
 Rather the notions that surround 
Palestinian statehood and a formative process therein, as represented by dominant social 
forces (Israel, the US, international institutions, and Palestinian elites) do not require the 
establishment of a Palestinian state per se. Importantly, this paper uses the phrases 
“Palestinian state formation” and “Palestinian state” in a manner consistent with 
international social forces as defined by various international institutions, meaning that 
the neoliberal conceptualization of Palestinian state formation is far more important for 
dominant social forces than actually creating a state. In fact, Palestine‟s 
internationalization may make a state – conceptualized in the traditional sense – 
unnecessary to the realization of the goals of Palestinian, Israeli, and global capital. A 
neoliberal conceptualization of Palestine means that no state is actually required to induce 
into existence the neoliberal condition in Palestine. 
 Below, I will analyze international institutions through a neo-Gramscian 
theoretical framework in two phases – the Oslo period (1993 – 2000), and the post-Oslo 
                                                 
3
 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” originally published October 1918; available, www.sscnet.ucla.edu; 
"State"   The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, (eds.) Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); available, www.oxfordreference.com.  
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period (2000 – present) – to investigate the raison d’être and dynamics of international 
institutions in configuring Palestinian social forces toward neoliberal state formation. 
Furthermore, this study investigates how international institutions shape the notion of a 
future Palestinian state through their policy recommendations and development projects, 
which ensures neoliberal policies and values in the conceptualizing a Palestinian state 
building project.   
 
1.2 Research Hypothesis  
 
 
International institutions configure Palestine in two major ways toward the neoliberal 
condition. First, international institutions play a major role in shaping the notion of 
Palestinian state formation through their relationship with Israel. Support for agreements 
that clearly favor the industrialized, sovereign state of Israel perpetuate the colonial 
relationship that Israel and its supporters bring to the conceptualization of Palestinian 
state formation. Second, international institutions ensure a neoliberal project in the 
schema of Palestinian state formation through policy prescriptions and development 
projects that guide the concept and planning for a potential Palestinian state toward the 
dominant neoliberal ideology in an emerging world order. This logic is consequently 
embedded within Palestinian political economy and represented through official political 
and economic discourse. Elite Palestinian social forces agree to terms that are mutually 
agreeable because of their individual capital accumulation in this process. Elite 
Palestinian social forces comprise those built into the construction of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and other positions of political prominence along with the forces of 
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Palestinian private capital, in the Palestinian territories and the Diaspora.
4
 Terms that are 
mutually agreeable include the vision, recommendations, and implementation of the 
framework through the conduit of international institutions and embedded within 
Palestinian political economy.  
 Through these means, international institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal 
political and economic values in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. This study 
analyzes the relationship between international institutions and state formation in 
Palestine through a neo-Gramscian perspective, utilizing concepts such as hegemony, 
world order, and internationalization of the state to show what is being created in 
Palestine and how this is being done. Although political and economic liberalism existed 
in the Palestinian territories prior to the 1990s, the framework was directly implemented 
during the Oslo process (1993 – 2000), when international institutions came en masse to 
the Palestinian territories to aid the Oslo process and assist in conceptualizing Palestine 
through neoliberal policy prescriptions and development projects.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective  
 
 
A number of concepts from a neo-Gramscian perspective are useful for analyzing the 
relationship between international institutions and Palestinian state formation. Robert 
Cox initially brought the critical approach to international relations in the early 1980s 
through his seminal articles appearing in Millennium – “Social Forces, States and World 
Order” and “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations.”5 In these writings, Cox 
                                                 
4
 See Figure 1: Palestinian Political Structure.  
5
 Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory” in Critical 
Concepts in Political Science Vol. 4 by Andrew Linklater (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2000): 1537 – 
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expounded on a number of Gramscian concepts to illuminate a new approach for 
exploring the dynamics of international relations and international political economy. For 
purposes of this paper, I engage several neo-Gramscian concepts such as hegemony, 
world order, and internationalization of the state to investigate and illuminate the 
relationship between international institutions and Palestinian state formation. 
 Cox‟s revival of Gramci‟s innovative conceptualization of hegemony is more 
flexible than realist approaches because it does not depend solely on a dominant state, but 
rather a confluence of social forces that are consolidated through coercion and consent in 
power dynamics. Social forces can exist within states, but are not delimited by national 
boundaries.
6
 In this schema, the world is a configuration of interacting social forces, 
where the state acts as a semi-autonomous intermediary in social relations between global 
and local social forces.
7
 In the process of hegemonic consolidation, consent is partly 
garnered through the production and changing of institutions, because institutionalization 
of certain ideas creates norms. Institutions also largely eliminate the need for force, as 
they represent non-violent forms of consent. In this way, a neo-Gramscian conception of 
hegemony entails a cultural element such as morals, social values, and beliefs, which are 
integrated in the (contested) process for hegemonic consolidation. In short, neo-
Gramscian hegemony is a matrix of power, ideas, and institutions.
8
  
 The process for national hegemonic consolidation is constantly contested and 
does not follow a linear path, as hegemony is a glimpse of a moment, not an eternal end 
                                                                                                                                                 
1571, originally published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 no. 2 (1981): 126 – 155, and 
“Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method” in Critical Concepts in Political 
Science Vol. 3 by Andrew Linklater (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2000): 1207 – 1222, originally 
published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 no. 2 (1983): 162 – 175. 
6
 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1554. 
7
 Ibid, 1554.  
8
 Ibid, 1553.  
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game. According to Cox, “hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behavior in most 
people most of the time.”9 Hegemony is a constant negotiation and struggle for a social 
class to exert itself, while co-opting enough oppositional elements to have the appearance 
and appeal of universality. In this way, hegemony or consolidation thereof on national or 
international levels is never absolute. A neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony therefore 
avoids some of the criticisms of earlier Marxist theories that were layered in deterministic 
assumptions.
10
    
 The international expansion of a particular hegemony signals the process whereby 
world hegemony could be created. This can happen from particular social forces 
consolidating within a state and pushing that hegemonic project toward a world scale or it 
could be a configuration of social forces between states that are seeking consolidation 
through further integration with each other in world order.
11
 According to Cox, world 
order is conceptualized in that “ „World‟ designates the relevant totality, geographically 
limited by the range of probable interaction…„Order‟ is used in the sense of the way 
things usually happen...”12 The nation-state system is one historical form of world order. 
A world order is composed of interacting social forces, although not limited to state 
entities. Our current moment, one of an emerging world order, is highly influenced by 
neoliberal political economy. According to David Harvey: 
“Neoliberalism in the first instance is a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
                                                 
9
 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations,” 1210.  
10
 While this has been a critique of orthodox Marxism, this has also been problematic is dependency and 
world systems approaches.   
11
 Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order, and Historical 
Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” Class and Capital 82 (2004): 93.  
12
 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1565.  
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characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The 
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such practices.”13  
 
Neoliberalism embraces free market relationships – free enterprise, labor that is flexible 
to market demands, and states that provide regulatory and legal frameworks through 
policies and institutions that support capital accumulation. At our current juncture, the 
role of the state plays an important role in a neoliberal-influenced emerging world order, 
which is to secure the accumulation of capital among a small, but powerful elite through 
institutional and policy-oriented mechanisms. These mechanisms create the legal and 
regulatory environment that is necessary for neoliberal capital accumulation to occur 
among elite social forces. States develop institutions and policies to establish the 
conditions under which this can occur such as guaranteeing the integrity of money or 
creating markets where none previously existed, such as water.
14
   
 The neoliberal framework, values, and ideology are subsumed structurally within 
governance institutions and spaces of capital. While neoliberalism as a term is generally 
applied by critics, the ideology in embodied across the political spectrum and within a 
wide range of policies throughout the world. More tangibly, neoliberalism is located 
within social forces and key institutions that work together, such as multinational capital, 
Ministries of Finance and/or Treasury, think tanks, and international organizations such 
as the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO).
 15 
Neoliberal 
terminology such as “good governance,” “private-sector driven growth,” “fiscal 
discipline,” “export promotion,” “poverty reduction,” and “economic reform,” are 
                                                 
13
 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
14
 Ibid, 2.  
15
 Wendy Larner, “Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentability,” Studies in Political Economy 63 
(Autumn 2000): 8. 
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utilized to put a positive spin on processes that downsize the public sector and 
government provisioning of social welfare. In this logic, individuals are to become 
healthy and responsible producers and consumers, while infrastructure should be 
developed to make capital investment and trade easier – all of which are necessary for a 
business friendly environment and the accumulation of capital. 
 Neoliberalism has been enshrined in a number of elite-based “consensuses,” 
which represent how the process for hegemonic consolidation of an ideology is 
negotiated within an emerging world order. In 1989, the neoliberal framework was 
articulated into a list of policy prescriptions known as the “Washington Consensus” by 
John Williamson, then Chief Economist of the World Bank in South Asia. The so-called 
Washington Consensus was particularly timely given the fall of state capitalism in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Following this time-period, many non-dominant states 
underwent national restructuring at the behest of international institutions through 
macroeconomic structural adjustment programs, whose main aim was to free capital 
through deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of capital, investment, and trade. 
This is why structural adjustment programs that were implemented with the assistance of 
international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF were almost exact replicas of 
the recommendations enshrined in the Washington Consensus and became equivalent 
with national restructuring and development. Since that time, neoliberal capitalism has 
entered what Joseph Stieglitz, former head of the World Bank, has termed the “Post-
Washington Consensus,” followed by another round of elite-based consensuses at 
Monterrey and Doha. While the thrust of neoliberalism has been carried through a 
12 
 
number of conceptualizations and the rhetoric varies slightly in each, there are no major 
structural differences in each neoliberal consensus.   
 International social forces have created a hegemonic project around neoliberal 
political economy and there appears to be an ideological consensus among elite social 
forces regarding the framework, but world hegemony of neoliberalism in total that 
informs the construction of world order has not yet been consolidated. In this sense, there 
is an emerging world order where international institutions facilitate the particularities of 
neoliberalism and the configuration of social forces toward neoliberal hegemonic 
consolidation in world order. As an expression of universal norms, international 
institutions facilitate world order. They play a very important role in representing and 
expanding hegemony ideologically and tangibly. They assist ideologically in the 
standardization of domestic policies, such as trade and finance, with those of a neoliberal 
world economy. On the ground, this means helping create appropriate policy frameworks 
with pertinent governance institutions and advancing established international practices 
through development projects in developing states.  
 International organizations bring international norms and practices of neoliberal 
development to transitional and developing states through policy advice and donor 
funded development projects. International institutions play a major role in these 
processes although for purposes of this paper, it is their role in assisting in national 
(re)structuring that is of primary importance. Since the state of Palestine has never 
existed, international institutions simply seek to structure Palestine along neoliberal lines. 
This was the primary objective for international institutions in entering the Palestinian 
territories during the Oslo process. Through neoliberal policy recommendations and 
13 
 
development projects, international institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal values in 
the conceptualization and planning of Palestinian state formation.  
 Through various means, such as the opening of national economies for diversified 
and internationalized production, services, communications, and finance, the notion of 
international obligation, integrated military cooperation such as NATO, and international 
assistance for reconstruction and development especially in the post-WWII period 
indicate that states have become internationalized.
16
 Importantly, a neo-Gramscian 
approach does not argue that states are disappearing in the face of global integration. On 
the contrary, it argues that states are being restructured in this dynamic process. 
Internationalization of the state means that states have become more salient to 
international practices, rules, and norms. Particularly in the post-WWII reconstruction 
process and in the debt crisis of the 1970s-80s, international institutions have penetrated 
non-dominant states through macroeconomic stabilization and development programs, 
albeit is slightly different ways. Cox notes that,   
“Economically weak countries were to be given assistance by the system itself, 
either directly through the system‟s institutions or by other states nominally 
certified by the system‟s institutions. These institutions incorporated mechanisms 
to supervise the application of the system‟s norms and to make financial 
assistance effectively conditional upon reasonable evidence of intent to live up the 
norms.”17         
 
An internationalized state becomes a “transmission belt” from the national to global 
economy.
18
 In this way, a neoliberal state is one that has been internationalized, at least to 
some degree. In the emerging world order, states act as “intermediate though 
                                                 
16
 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1558.  
17
 Ibid, 1558.  
18
 Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 302.  
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autonomous” mechanisms between domestic and global social forces.19 In these 
processes, international and sometimes transnational social forces have emerged in the 
form of capitalists, state managers, intellectuals, and personnel of international 
organizations.
20
 Domestically, this is prioritized in governance institutions where local 
social forces tend to interact with international social forces such as the Prime Minister‟s 
office, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Planning.
21
 The coherence and unity of these 
social forces should not be overstated, as suggested by critics, because the process for 
hegemonic consolidation of social forces (whether on the national or international level) 
is always contested.
22
 Neoliberal configurations are complex and hybrid, representing 
general thrusts rather than fixed formations. In addition, it is important to take seriously 
the critique that internationalization of the state has a deterministic and hierarchical 
tendency, which can ignore counter-hegemonic agents in the process.
23
 In this light, the 
concept needs re-rooting in what makes a neo-Gramscian analysis so appealing in the 
first place – that the process for hegemonic consolidation among various social forces 
should wholly be seen as dynamic and contested.    
 Capitalism, but particularly its neoliberal variant, has always required a 
transnational network of capitalists to sustain it. The norms, rules, and practices (the 
institutionalization of neoliberalism) are brought to the Palestinian territories through 
international organizations and domestic elites that are integrated into global capital. 
                                                 
19
 Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1554.  
20
 Ibid, 1561. 
21
 Ibid, 1559.  
22
 Daniel Egan, “Global Capitalism and the Internationalization of the State: Some Lessons from the Defeat 
of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,” (paper submitted for the International Conference on the 
Work of Karl Marx and Challenges for the 21
st
 Century, Havana, Cuba, May 5 – 8,  2003), 4; available, 
www.bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org. 
23
 Ibid, 4; Andre Drainville, “International Political Economy in the Age of Open Marxism,” Review of 
International Political Economy 1 no. 1 (Spring 1994): 105 – 132.  
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Together, these social forces seek to educate, negotiate, and consolidate a neoliberal form 
of hegemony within the conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. While 
capitalism has historically been directed by elite social forces, it is important to remember 
that capitalism is an on-going, contested process, that co-opts some and marginalizes 
others along its historical trajectory.  
 I will apply a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to the work of international 
institutions in Palestinian state formation because this allows for an analysis of various 
social forces between the national and international levels and the contested terrain over 
which hegemony is negotiated. The neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony and the role 
of international institutions in a hegemonic project apply to activities of international 
institutions in the Palestinian territories, specifically through neoliberal policy 
prescriptions and international development projects. A final point in conceptualizing 
neoliberalism as an integrated element in the construction of hegemony and world order 
is to take seriously the claim by Wendy Larner that “without analyses of the „messy 
actualities‟ of particular neo-liberal projects, those working within this analytic run the 
risk of precisely the problem they wish to avoid – that of producing generalized accounts 
of historical epochs.”24 It is the “messy actualities” of a particular neoliberal project 
within an approaching world order – Palestinian state formation – that this study analyzes 
through a neo-Gramcian approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Larner, 14.  
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1.4 Significance of Topic 
 
 
Assessing the role of international institutions in shaping the concept of a Palestinian 
state is important for a number of reasons. First, international institutions play a large role 
in developing states, particularly those that arise from conflict or are transitioning toward 
capitalist development from a former state-based mode of production. In the view of 
international institutions, developing, emerging, and/or transitional states and economies 
are in need of assistance to bring them in line with established international neoliberal 
norms and practices. Although denied sovereignty to date, the Palestinian territories are 
not immune to the prescriptions and logic of international institutions. Quite uniquely, 
Palestinians have been subject to neoliberal recommendations and logic of international 
institutions prior to state formation. The case of Palestine is unique in the regard that 
Palestinians seek national liberation from a settler-colonial state and occupation during a 
historical moment that is different from most other national liberation movements.
 25
 It is 
a time when the politics of state formation and a potentially emerging state are wrapped 
up in the neoliberal political economy of an emerging world order. International 
institutions are actively involved in this process and have had a direct role in the 
Palestinian state building project by supporting institutional development of the PA 
pseudo-state apparatus and other development projects and recommending policies that 
ensure neoliberal values in the configuring and conceptualization of state formation. 
 Second, international institutions have power in a dialectical relationship with 
nation-states. The current dynamic is one of interconnection and integration, particularly 
                                                 
25
 Jamil Hilal, “Problematizing Democracy in Palestine,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East 23 no. 1 & 2 (2003): 170.  
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through finance, investment, trade, and communications. Economic relations are 
increasingly integrated, although regulated by the institutions that were established 
during uneven core-periphery capitalist development “that reflect the broader US-led 
system of strategic alliances.”26 Furthermore, increasing integration through international 
and global institutional arrangements, such as the G-8 and WTO are making independent 
policy formulation very difficult on the national level. Because international institutions 
have power, they represent and serve the interests of dominant social and economic 
forces. In this arrangement, international institutions play a key role in representing and 
recreating dominant social forces, in terms of hegemonic nation-states (the US) and 
internally on their own terms.
27
 In this way, international institutions play an active role 
in the creation and maintenance of international rules, norms, practices, etc. In their own 
right, as important actors in world order, international institutions require in-depth 
analysis from a range of perspectives.   
 Lastly, as will be shown in the literature review that follows, there has been a 
recurring dynamic in analyzing the potential for Palestinian state formation. This 
dynamic tends either to analyze how or why a Palestinian state has not formed to date, or 
analyses of what is needed to create a viable Palestinian state in the future. Too often, an 
analysis of what is presently being formed in Palestine (along with the how and why of 
this particular formation), is sidelined for the benefit of hindsight or hopeful notions 
about the future. A neo-Gramscian approach is helpful in this endeavor because the 
perspective allows for investigation of various social forces irrespective of the formation 
                                                 
26
 Paola Subacchi, “New Power Centers and New Power Brokers: Are They Shaping a New Economic 
Order?” International Affairs 84 no. 3 (2008): 497.  
27
 Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), 252.  
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of a formal state or not. Since the state is not a necessary variable in utilizing a neo-
Gramscian approach, the perspective lends itself to more accurate analysis of the current 
dynamics in the Palestinian territories through international and domestic social forces, 
that is the establishment of the neoliberal condition in Palestine without the formation of 
a formal state.     
  
1.5 Chapter Outline  
 
 
My argument is outlined as follows. In chapter 2, I review the literature on my thesis 
topic by pointing to the positive contributions of scholars and reiterating a gap in the 
literature in applying a neo-Gramscian approach to the case of Palestinian state 
formation. Chapters 3 and 4 comprise the body of my argument by showcasing how 
international institutions configure social forces in the Palestinian territories to ensure 
neoliberal values and development in conceptualizing a Palestinian state. Chapter 3 
focuses on the Oslo process (1993 – 2000) and Chapter 4 deals with the post-Oslo phase 
that spans to the present. Each chapter discusses the main ways that international 
institutions permeate domestic Palestinian political economy, i.e. policy 
recommendations and development projects, to shape the concept of a Palestinian state 
and economy toward the neoliberal ideological thrust of an emanating world order. I 
conclude my thesis with a review of my findings, as illustrated throughout the paper, and 
emphasize that Palestine‟s conceptualization will continue to be rooted in the 
development of the neoliberal condition as long as a political process that would lead to 
Palestinian self-determination and an end the conflict is not pursued.           
 
19 
 
Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature 
 
Edward Said has been one of the most prominent scholars in promoting Palestinian self-
determination and critically approaching the role of Israel, Palestinians, and the 
international community in their efforts toward that end. From The Question of Palestine 
(1979) to The End of the Peace Process (2000), Said consistently and forcefully argued 
that Palestinians were dispossessed from their homeland when the state of Israel was 
established in 1948 and were persistently denied their inalienable right to self-
determination.
28
 He did this by often invoking historical narrative to support his claims 
and sharing his own experiences as a Palestinian refugee and the plight of the Palestinian 
Diaspora through their quest for national identity and liberation. Said emphasized that 
Israel‟s relationship with the Palestinians, ambivalent Arab regimes in the region, and 
elite Palestinians willing to sell-out the Palestinian national cause contributed to the 
continued failure of peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and made 
justice for Palestinians more elusive. The persistent and thorough critique of dominant 
social forces along with Said‟s compelling use of historical narrative toward his claims 
has arguably placed him among the most prolific and influential writer for any scholar of 
Palestine.  
 Following in the vein of Said, scholars of Palestine have often focused on the 
challenges facing Palestinians and their plight toward statehood. There has been an 
overarching emphasis on structures and processes that have failed to solve the question of 
Palestine. A dominant thrust in reading the failure of conceptualizing Palestine is blamed 
                                                 
28
 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979) and The End of 
the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Vintage, 2000).  
20 
 
on the problematic nature of the Oslo Accords, and the process more generally. Said was 
one of the first and most vocal critics of the Oslo Accords. Three of Said‟s books during 
the Oslo process: The Politics of Dispossession, Peace and its Discontents, and The End 
of the Peace Process were highly critical of the Oslo Accords, particularly of the social 
forces that served to benefit from the unjust nature of the Accords – Israel, the 
international community, and prominent Palestinians.
29
 He posited that the Accords 
would have few positive effects for Palestinians in the Palestinian territories and further 
dismembered the Palestinian national cause by ignoring Palestinians in Israel and those in 
the Diaspora, mostly refugees. In their perpetual quest for justice and self-determination, 
Said argued that Palestinians were moving further away from that prospect.  
 Critics of the Oslo process argue that Oslo was problematic for a number of 
reasons, of which all agree that the outcome has not been positive for a majority of 
Palestinians, despite various interpretations of what went wrong in the process. For 
instance, Leila Farsakh emphasizes that economic viability of a Palestinian state 
minimally requires Palestinian sovereignty over lands occupied in 1967, free movement 
and access between Palestinian territories, and clear, defined borders of a Palestinian 
state.
30
 According to Farsakh, the failure to address these issues in the Accords led to 
legal, territorial, and economic effects of a system similar to Bantustans created under 
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South African apartheid.
31
 Furthermore, she argues that the Al-Aqsa intifada was a 
rejection of the Oslo process and its economic premise.
32
 Joel Beinin‟s “Pax Americana” 
thesis argues that the Oslo Accords represent the regional and international balance of 
power, primarily through Israel‟s regional military superiority and alliance with the 
United States.
33
 According to this point of view, the so-called special relationship, or 
more accurately termed strategic alliance, between the US and Israel is the main 
impediment to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a political 
settlement. He asserts that the Oslo process was part of a larger US plan to maintain 
hegemony in the region after the victory in the 1991 Gulf War. According to Beinin, 
alliances in the new Middle East were based on “enhanced capital investment, access to 
regional markets, and expanded opportunities for profit.”34 Beinin made a strong case that 
the underlying nature of the Accords – that of US strategy to maintain dominance through 
neoliberal peace dividends – prevented the potential to actually establish a Palestinian 
state.  
 Yoav Peled claims that Oslo was not a failed peace process, but rather a failed 
attempt at partial decolonization.
35
 Peled suggests that the Oslo process was part of a 
larger liberalization thrust within Israeli society, and that neoliberal peace and 
privatization are causally connected. Similar to Benin, Peled believes the Oslo process 
                                                 
31
 Farsakh, “Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?” Middle East Journal 59 
no. 2 (Spring 2005): 230 – 245.  
32
 Farsakh, “Under Siege: Closure, Separation, and the Palestinian Economy,” MERIP Middle East Report 
217 (Winter 2000); available, www.merip.org. 
33
 Joel Beinin, "Palestine and Israel: Perils of a Neoliberal, Repressive, Pax Americana," Social Justice 25 
no. 4 (1998): 20 – 39; Joel Beinin and Rebecca Stein, The struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 
1993-2005 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).  
34
 Beinin, "Palestine and Israel,” 34.  
35
 Yoav Peled and Greshon Shafir, eds., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2001); Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  
22 
 
was part of a larger neoliberal thrust throughout the region and world. However, his 
outlook focuses more particularly on how Israeli elite social forces embraced 
neoliberalism and the potential for peace dividends through the Accords with the 
Palestinians to accumulate capital more efficiently in an increasingly integrated global 
economy. Not entirely different, Peter Lagerquist argues in “Privatizing the Occupation,” 
that the Oslo process and the neoliberal development opportunities it purported were 
simply the result of colonial prerogatives in the current context of globalization.
36
 In 
addition, Adel Samara in “Globalization, the Palestinian Economy, and the „Peace 
Process‟ ” argues that adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the Palestinian 
territories has led to a form of “development” that does not serve the majority of the 
Palestinian population.
37
 Rather, the focus on neoliberal development during the Oslo 
process has been the result of international (including Israeli) and Palestinian social 
forces collaborating for the purposes of capital accumulation, rather than a political 
settlement or the creation of a viable Palestinian state.        
 Even before the Oslo process, materialist considerations played an important role 
in explaining why Palestinian state formation has not yet taken place. Sara Roy, a leading 
scholar on the political economy of the Gaza Strip, argues that an uneven economic 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians has systematically distorted and 
prevented a productive economic base for a viable Palestinian economy. Instead, the 
result of Israel‟s political and ideological objectives has been a persistent de-development 
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of the Palestinian economy.
38
 She argues that while the conflict and occupation of 
Palestine are political in nature, they have negative economic effects that undoubtedly 
play a role in Palestinian development and state building.
39
 
        More recent work has focused upon the role of aid in the Palestinian territories, and 
how that role affects Palestinian state formation. Immediately following the Oslo process, 
Rex Brynen‟s study of the mechanics and difficulties of international assistance to 
Palestinians emphasized the negative and positive role of aid in developing the PA and in 
the peace process more generally.
40
 However, as the decade progressed and Brynen 
analyzed the politics of aid through the course of the second intifada, he became 
increasingly critical of international donors and their usage of aid in the Palestinian 
territories. In his more recent work, “Aid as Carrot, Aid as Stick,” Brynen argues that aid 
cannot change the failures of the peace process or substitute for the political process that 
is necessary to build a Palestinian state.
41
 A number of authors have pointed to the 
problematic role international assistance has played on the ground in the Palestinian 
territories, namely by ignoring the political context that makes aid necessary.
42
 The theme 
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throughout this body of work contends that international aid has prevented the 
development of a Palestinian state by legitimizing and subsidizing the Israeli occupation 
of Palestinian territories. Ann LeMore argues that realities on the ground are 
incompatible with a state building project and that the international community is funding 
the demise of a Palestinian state as long as aid accommodates Israeli occupation rather 
than challenging those policies.
43
  
 It has also been suggested that the realization of Palestine has failed due to 
Palestinian governance related issues, of which Palestinians may have very little control 
according to some scholars. Instead of unequal peace agreements, uneven economic 
relations, or the problematic role of international assistance, this point of view holds that 
Palestinian political factors must be considered in understanding the reasons Palestine has 
failed to form. An anthology titled, State Formation in Palestine edited by Mushtaq Khan 
considers how corruption, rent-seeking and democratic weaknesses within the PA have 
potentially continued the conflict with Israel and prevented the formation of a Palestinian 
state.
44
 The authors conclude that not all corruption is necessarily harmful for state 
formation. They assert that political rents are pervasive in all developing countries and if 
managed appropriately can play a positive role in economic transitioning and political 
stability.  
 Another thrust in this body of work argues that the PA, through the leadership of 
Yasir Arafat and Fatah, brought an authoritarian style of leadership to governance in the 
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Palestinian territories, which has prevented the development of a Palestinian state. 
Focusing on the PLO and its transformation into the PA, Glen Robinson argues in 
Building a Palestinian State that a disconnect between the popular movement created 
during the first intifada and the authoritarian tendencies of the PLO as it morphed into the 
PA diminished the prospects for viable Palestinian state formation.
45
 Similarly, 
Countdown to Statehood by Hillel Frisch, is a comparative analysis of the Palestinian 
state building project with that of Zionism and the establishment of Israel.
46
 His study 
leads him to conclude that Palestinians face far more challenges in building a state than 
those experienced by Zionists. He considers the decisions facing the PLO given their 
placement in the Diaspora prior to the Oslo process and suggests the PLO leadership 
chose tight control from the outside. When the PLO was brought under the new rubric of 
the PA during the Oslo process, the previous decisions of the PLO were transposed onto 
the Palestinian territories, which created a “neopatrimonial” system of governance in the 
Palestinian territories.  
 Yezid Sayigh agrees that PLO decision making prior to the Oslo Accords led to 
an authoritarian style of leadership during the Oslo process, but his research places more 
emphasis on the relationship between armed struggle and state formation in Palestine.
47
 
Despite the eventual governance style, he argues that armed struggle was important for 
the Palestinian national cause because it allowed for the creation of institutions and a 
political elite, which according to Sayigh are the basis of government. Despite the fact 
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that armed struggle has not liberated Palestine, Sayigh concludes that this form of 
resistance did play an important role in developing the foundations for a potential 
Palestinian state in the future. Sayigh‟s later work, however, reveals a shift from the 
potential for Palestinian statehood to severe skepticism of this prospect. In “Inducing a 
Failed State in Palestine” Sayigh argues that the Palestinian territories represent all the 
conditions of state collapse due to the continued impact of international intervention, 
which inhibits the ability for adequate domestic governance through the PA.
48
  
 Moving from explicating why a Palestinian state has failed to materialize, 
neoliberal institutional analyses from the World Bank, IMF, and other international 
institutions focus on prescriptions of what is needed, in the current moment, for Palestine 
to form as a (neoliberal) state. According to international financial and development 
organizations, any potential Palestinian state should have an open economy that is driven 
by private sector growth and integrated into regional and global markets through 
competitive goods and services.
49
 This would enable an environment that is conducive to 
the accumulation of capital for various social forces (domestic and international), which 
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is facilitated through a policy framework of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. 
According to the neoliberal institutionalist approach, prolonged conflict has created 
structural impairments such as persistent unemployment, dependency on Israel and 
international aid, political instability, and lacking legal protection for private property 
that are in need of adjustment for Palestine to economically recover and become a state.
50
 
In the case of trade, scholars disagree on the exact shape of the preferable trade regime 
for a potential Palestinian state, although there is a consensus surrounding the importance 
of trade liberalization and expansion in harmonizing Palestinian trade policies with 
neoliberal practices in an emerging world order.
51
 Furthermore, the neoliberal 
instituionalist approach calls for public sector reform and good governance in the 
Palestinian territories through institutional capacity building, fiscal discipline, and the 
encouragement of policies that support trade and private investment.   
   Despite the positive contributions of various scholars considering why or how 
Palestine has failed to form, there are few analytical tools available in these approaches 
for investigating the relationship between international institutions and the 
conceptualization of Palestine in our current moment. A neo-Gramscian approach can 
bridge the analytical gap in relation to international institutions and Palestinian state 
formation because the perspective allows for a more flexible analysis of state formation 
through the configuration of domestic and international social forces.
 52
 I will utilize a 
neo-Gramscian approach as developed by Cox to investigate this relationship because it 
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is the most useful perspective for organizing the structures and processes, i.e. the 
dynamic linkages between international institutions and social forces in the configuration 
of conceptualizing a neoliberal state in Palestine. Hegemony, as reinterpreted by Cox, is a 
centerpiece for understanding world order, meaning a neoliberal-influenced emerging 
world order and the corresponding processes that internationalize the state. Exploring 
international institutions as dynamic forces in the schema of conceptualizing Palestinian 
state formation allows for simultaneous conceptualization of producer and product of 
hegemony in domestic (Palestinian) and international political economy. Although 
hegemony is not singularly expressed or created in international institutions, it is an 
important mechanism in the process of institutionalization that creates norms, values, and 
rules in world order. In this way, a neo-Gramscian lens allows for the locations of 
structures and agents in the Palestinian territories that are configuring social forces 
toward a conceptualization of Palestine that is neoliberal in nature.   
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Chapter 3 – The Oslo Accords: International Institutions Create a 
Framework for Conceptualizing Palestinian Neoliberal State Formation 
(1993 – 2000) 
 
 
3.1 The Oslo Context  
 
 
The Oslo Accords were bilateral agreements between the government of Israel and the 
PLO that were brokered with the assistance of Norway. The Accords were based on 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 242, the so-called land for peace 
formula, and UNSC resolution 338. The Oslo Accords consisted of the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, otherwise known as the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) or Oslo I along with an Interim Agreement or Oslo II 
that included the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of 
Power and Responsibilities, and the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West Bank and 
Gaza.
53
 Additionally, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed 
in January 1997 and in October 1998, the Wye River Memorandum was signed at the 
White House in Washington D.C., between Israel and the PLO.
54
 The Accords ended five 
years of the first Palestinian uprising or intifada that represented many Palestinian 
frustrations as a result of Israeli military occupation and were cast as “interim” 
agreements that would eventually lead to a political settlement through final status 
negotiations. However, the Oslo Accords were agreements between two unequal parties, 
where one country was large, advanced, sovereign, and historically assisted in its 
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development (Israel); the other being small, not sovereign or developed, and only 
recently financially assisted (Palestinian territories). Asymmetrical power dynamics and a 
number of design flaws prohibited the Oslo Accords from transforming the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict into anything beyond interim agreements.  
 The Accords themselves represent an international institution in that both parties 
agreed to the terms and accepted them as binding (at least in theory) and were supported 
by the international community. However, international support for agreements that 
clearly favor an industrialized, sovereign state over stateless indigenous peoples 
perpetuates the colonial relationship that Israel and its supporters bring to the 
conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. Specifically, the structure and terms of 
the Accords, and the Oslo process more generally prevented the actual formation of a 
Palestinian state by focusing instead on conceptualizing state formation through a 
framework of neoliberal policy prescriptions and development projects. This obviated the 
context of Israeli occupation and allowed Israel to further institutionalize its occupation 
in the Palestinian territories.
55
 
 As part of the Accords, the Palestinian territories were divided into three groups; 
Palestinians were allowed a limited amount of “self-rule” over a small percentage of 
territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Area A, Palestinians were in control of civil 
administration and security, Area B was a mix of Palestinian civil administration and 
Israeli security control, while Israel retained full control of both civil administrative and 
security matters in Area C.
56
  Area C amounted to 59 percent of the West Bank, while 
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Israel retained security control over an additional 23.8 percent in Area B. In total, Israel 
controlled 82.8 percent of the West Bank, while Palestinians were only in full control of 
the remaining 17.2 percent.
57
 Areas A and B, of which Palestinians maintained minimal 
control, comprised the major Palestinian population centers in the territories, but only 
formed a small percentage of surface land, while Area C comprised a majority of the 
territory, was contiguous, and surrounded Areas A and B.
58
 
 The Palestinian territories were further fragmented during the Oslo process by the 
rapid increase in the Israeli settler population. During the Oslo process, Israeli settlers in 
the Palestinian territories increased by over 50 percent from 240,000 in 1993 to 380,000 
by 2000.
59
  The Accords were very clear on maintaining Israeli territorial integrity in 
Area C and protecting the private property rights of Israelis in Palestinian controlled 
areas, although made no similar protections for Palestinians.
60
 The customs union (CU) 
formed under the “Protocol on Economic Relations” (Paris Protocol 1994) in Annex V 
especially represented the larger dynamic of the agreements that ultimately gave Israel far 
more power and rights than those assigned to the PA. The Paris Protocol reinstated a 
quasi CU between Israel and the Palestinian territories that had been essentially in effect 
since Israel‟s occupation of the territories in 1967.61 Because of structural constraints 
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built into the CU, economic viability for a future Palestinian state was severely curtailed. 
Trade was liberalized by applying a common external tariff, which was structured 
according to the Israeli economy and Israeli trade policy. As a developed country with 
one of the highest VAT rates in the world, Israel protected its own industry by not 
exposing it to the competition a less developed country could offer in a global economy.  
 In addition, a revenue clearance system was created as a part of the CU, whereby 
Israel collects taxes on behalf of the PA on goods imported through Israel whose final 
destination is the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Israel then remits these taxes back to the PA, 
which in turn provides a major source of revenue for the Authority. While a quasi CU 
existed prior to the Oslo process, the revenue clearance system was a specific feature of 
the Accords. Israel periodically uses its administrative role as transmitter of taxes for 
political and economic reasons. This happens when Israel withholds VAT and customs 
duties or uses the revenue to pay for Israeli services provided to Palestinians.
62
 Because 
the Paris Protocol institutionalized economic integration, the PA had very limited space 
to create its own policies and was restricted primarily to expenditure allocation.    
 Terms of the Accords permitted Israel to consolidate its control over its external 
borders and those within the West Bank. The DOP maintained Israel‟s control of internal 
and external security and delegated Palestinian foreign relations to final status 
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negotiations.
63
 This allowed Israel to implement closure within and from the Palestinian 
territories, justified by Israel for security reasons and authorized by the international 
community. Closure, or the restriction of movement and access, has become a permanent 
fixture in the Palestinian territories since the Oslo process. It began as an elaborate permit 
and license plate system that dictated who could travel in and between certain areas and 
has expanded since Oslo to include other facets such as the separation wall that Israel 
began constructing in 2002.
64
   
 Closure over the Palestinian territories works internally and externally by 
preventing movement of goods and people. It can be partial with some movement 
disrupted or total, where all movement and access is completely halted. Internal closure 
prevents movement within the West Bank through an extensive system of checkpoints, 
roadblocks, earth mounds, and other barriers to free movement. External closure prevents 
movement to and from Israel from the Palestinian territories or between the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank.
65
 Finally, external closure prevents movement or access to the outside 
world from the West Bank to Jordan or from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Between 1993 – 
1996, closure and permits cost an estimated $2.8 billion, which was double the amount of 
aid disbursed to the Palestinians during this time.
66
 In addition, Israel imposed 443 days 
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of closure, averaging 90 days per year between 1994 and 1999.
67
 Since the status of East 
Jerusalem was put off for final status negotiations, it remained permanently closed to 
Palestinians in other parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
 The economic integration structured into the Paris Protocol made the Palestinian 
economy even more vulnerable to closure as Palestinian goods and labor waited for 
checkpoints to open at the discretion of Israel. Trade and regular employment were 
frequently disrupted and thus unemployment increased. The nature of the Accords 
provided very little space for Palestinians to create independent policy and created a 
pseudo-legal rubric for segmenting Palestinian territory and dislocating communities into 
semi-autonomous cantons, which prevented a uniform base for Palestinian political and 
economic relations. This led to redundant political institutions and segmented economic 
activity. Implementing the Oslo Accords led to the de facto fragmentation of Palestinian 
territories, thereby preventing economic viability in the areas under limited Palestinian 
self-rule and the prospect for an economically viable Palestinian state in the future. In this 
way, the Oslo Accords institutionalized Israeli occupation, which further dismembered 
Palestine and imprinted an Israeli-colonial vision for a potential state. International 
institutions supported these processes and ignored the context of Israeli occupation, 
focusing instead on configuring a neoliberal notion of state formation by ideologically 
ensuring neoliberal values through policy recommendations and development projects in 
the Palestinian territories.   
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3.2 International Institutions and Palestinian State Formation during the Oslo 
Process 
 
 
The Oslo Accords became a juncture for international institutions to promote a neoliberal 
framework for political and economic development in conceptualizing a Palestinian state. 
With the signing of the Oslo Accords, a large influx of international organizations came 
to the Palestinian territories for the first time. The organizations ranged from state-based 
development agencies to international development and financial institutions. The 
number of international organizations and range of activities they were involved in was 
unprecedented for the Palestinian territories and a major indication of wide-ranging 
support for the internationally brokered Accords. Major international financial 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank came for the first time to the Palestinian 
territories, creating country offices, allocating budgets for country specific research and 
development projects, and employing local and foreign employees. Importantly, Palestine 
is not a formal member of most international organizations that are state-based in their 
membership given that Palestine as a sovereign state does not exist. As such, the 
willingness of international organizations to come to the territories despite this actuality 
is unique and indicative of their desire to be involved in configuring neoliberal conditions 
in the Palestinian territories.  
 The World Bank in particular has played an important role in the Palestinian 
territories since negotiations between Israel and PLO began in the early 1990s. The 
United States and Russia asked the Bank to participate in the Madrid conference in 1991, 
36 
 
as assistant to the chair in three multilateral working groups.
68
 When the Oslo Accords 
were signed, the Bank took on an extensive role in the territories, with some of its 
activities in line with its traditional role in other developing countries, and a number of 
activities outside its established purview. As in other developing countries, the Bank 
finances development projects and seeks to harmonize domestic policies with established 
rules, norms, and practices in an emerging neoliberal world order.  
 This is done primarily through monitoring and prioritizing macroeconomic 
domestic policies and supporting domestic social forces whose ideological leanings are 
mutually agreeable to consolidate national hegemony. The IMF also has an important, 
albeit slightly different role, in the Palestinian territories. Since the IMF became involved 
in the territories in the early 1990s is has worked closely with the PA, the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), 
mainly on public sector institutional development, management, and reform. Through 
technical assistance, economic analysis, and policy advice, the IMF provides the PA with 
part of the means for creating a neoliberal policy framework and good governance 
practices in PA institutions.   
 International institutions viewed a political settlement as necessary but not 
required for economic development in the Palestinian territories.
69
 Efforts to separate 
political and economic variables, particularly through the Bank‟s attempt to create 
“closure-proof trade routes” around industrial estates and free zones are one such 
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example.
70
 International institutions tried to deemphasize Israeli occupation and 
depoliticize the realities of the Oslo process by focusing on neoliberal policy 
recommendations and donor-funded development projects. This was frustrating for 
international institutions such as the World Bank as they were given a mandate to enable 
an investor-friendly environment, yet had no institutional or political capabilities to work 
on the structural features that created the conditions for an unfriendly investment 
environment in the Palestinian territories.
71
  
 During this time, development discourse began to play a much larger role in 
Palestinian political economy. The basic vision for political and economic neoliberal 
development purported that market-driven private sector growth and government 
downsizing were the driving forces in transforming underdeveloped states. At the time, a 
“laundry list” of recommendations was supported in vastly different parts of the world to 
allegedly bring the world‟s poorest nations to a state of development reached by 
advanced, wealthy states. As such, attempts to consolidate a neoliberal notion of 
Palestinian state formation during the Oslo process were “conducted under the hegemony 
of the ideology of economic liberalization, privatization, and „structural 
adjustment‟…with effective powerful global institutions (economic, communicational, 
and financial) demanding a redefinition of state sovereignty that facilitates the free flow 
of capital and commodities on a world scale...”72 Although Palestinian statehood was put 
off until a later date pending final status agreements, the participation of the international 
community played a vital role in promoting political and economic neoliberalism during 
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the Oslo process. International institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal values in 
conceptualizing Palestinian state formation through policy recommendations and 
development projects.     
 
3.2.1 Policy Recommendations  
 
 
Policy recommendations to Palestinians during the Oslo process were consistent with 
those recommended in other parts of the world at that time. The ideological discourse of 
neoliberalism in general called for trade liberalization, private sector driven economic 
growth, and public sector reform through good governance principals in the Palestinian 
territories. In the case of trade, international institutions disagree on the exact shape of the 
preferable trade regime in the Palestinian territories (whether it should be a CU, free trade 
or non-discriminatory trade agreement), although there is a consensus surrounding the 
importance of trade liberalization and expansion in harmonizing Palestinian trade policies 
with existing norms and practices in an emerging world order. 
 The World Bank focused on three major policy areas during the Oslo process. 
These included the benefits of private sector investment, economic liberalization, and 
independent macroeconomic policy, especially the possibility of a Palestinian currency.
73
 
Two weeks after the Oslo Accords were signed by Israel and the PLO the World Bank 
issued a comprehensive six volume report titled, “Developing the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories: An investment in Peace.” The study emphasized the structural dislocations in 
the Palestinian economy and called for policies that would support private-sector growth, 
export promotion, improvement of infrastructure and service delivery, and diversification 
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of future trade relations.
74
 The extensive nature of the volume and speed of its production 
raised some suspicion about the policy agendas of international institutions, and the Bank 
in particular. According to one of its own evaluation reports, the Bank notes, “The 
concomitant timing of publication of the report led some observers to wonder at the 
amazing speed and efficiency of the Bank, and other observers with a more conspiratorial 
turn of mind to infer that the Bank had somehow been appraised of the secret Oslo 
negotiations.”75 From the perspective of international organizations, the report became 
the blueprint for policy prescriptions and development in the Palestinian territories during 
the Oslo process.
76
  
 Good governance was encouraged through public management, fiscal discipline, 
and a policy framework that supported trade and investment. According to the World 
Bank, developing the private sector in Palestine “requires the creation of a legal and 
regulatory environment that supports private sector initiative. The legal system should 
provide a set of rules that govern property rights, their exchange and settlement of 
disputes…”77 The IMF primarily assisted in formulating fiscal, banking, trade, and 
potential monetary policies for the PA. Similar to the World Bank, they emphasized in 
1995 “the need for a strategy which is outward looking, led by the private sector, and able 
to promote sizeable nondebt credit private capital inflows for investment in productive, 
labor-intensive activities.”78 
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 During the Oslo process, the PLO did sign several trade agreements in an effort to 
bolster the PA and show the international community its readiness to be good trading 
partner in the world economy. This allowed Palestinian exports duty-free access to the 
US, Canada, EU, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Arab Free Trade 
Association (AFTA), and Turkey. 
79
 However, the agreements were only effective for 
Palestinian economic development insofar as Israel allowed goods to pass through its 
borders or the borders it controlled in the Palestinian territories to reach the outside 
world. Without this vital component in the process, Palestinian goods remained 
uncompetitive in regional and global markets as their stock and transit times continued to 
be unpredictable.  
 
3.2.2 Development Projects 
 
 
International organizations began to fund and plan for the future Palestinian state through 
development projects in the Palestinian territories during the Oslo process. In general, 
development projects work in tandem with policy prescriptions to create an enabling 
environment for the configuration of international and domestic social forces to negotiate 
and consolidate neoliberal values domestically and ensure those values in conceptualizing 
Palestinian state formation. Development projects focus on sectors such as education, 
health care, and infrastructure so that a stable environment is created for investment and 
production. The major actors involved in development projects include the major 
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international development and financial organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, 
various UN agencies, the EC, etc. along with individual state-based international 
development agencies (USAID, JICA, etc.).  
 While the activities of each organization take on different sectoral priorities, all 
development projects support a Palestinian state building project that coincides with the 
rules, norms, and practices of a neoliberal-influenced emerging world order. The 
construction of PA institutions was the focus of development during the Oslo process, as 
institutional development was seen as a vital component in creating the legal and 
regulatory environment necessary for neoliberal-based capital accumulation among elite 
social forces. The PA provided a governance structure for limited Palestinian self-rule 
over Areas A and B in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Similar to the larger thrust of the 
agreements, the PA was intended to be a transitional institution with restricted power. As 
such, the Authority had limited policy instruments at its disposal since in had no control 
over its borders or natural resources. The Paris Protocol further reinforced these structural 
limitations by integrating the Palestinian economy more into the Israeli economy than in 
the past by institutionalizing single monetary and trade policies between the Palestinian 
and Israeli economies.
80
         
 Aiding the development of the PA has played a dual role for donors. First, 
supporting the creation of the PA and its constant reform and (re)structuring through 
good governance principals has ensured a Palestinian negotiating partner for Israel on 
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terms agreed by the international community. Secondly, most donors believed that 
institutional development of the PA apparatus to be a foundational step in building a 
neoliberal environment for the ideological consolidation of social forces in the 
Palestinian state formation process. Even toward the end of the decade the World Bank 
was still saying “…more attention should be given to building competence within the PA, 
thus ensuring a capable system of governance that fosters and complements private-
sector driven growth.”81  
 
Donors, Funding, and Aid Coordination 
 
 
Coordination, management, and implementation of donor funds occurred through several 
complex mechanisms that were set up following the signing of the Oslo Accords. The 
international community donated over $3.4 billion to Palestinians during the Oslo 
process, with a ratio of 7:1 in favor of development aid to humanitarian assistance.
82
 
Main donors included the EC, US, World Bank, various EU countries, Japan, and Arab 
states.
83
 The architecture of international aid during the Oslo process comprised over 40 
countries, numerous UN agencies, local and international NGOs, Palestinian ministries, 
and the World Bank. At the Washington Conference for multilateral talks on peace in the 
Middle East in October 1993, the Multilateral Steering Group created the Ad Hoc Liaison 
Committee (AHLC). The AHLC consisted of 12 members and was the main body for 
developing a strategic vision and policy framework for international aid in the Palestinian 
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territories. Also at the capital level, a Consultative Group (CG) was established by the 
World Bank, which as in other recipient countries served as a forum to mobilize donor 
pledges and discuss policy issues.      
  At the local level, two main bodies were initially established for coordinating 
international aid: the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) and the Local Aid Coordination 
Committee (LACC). The JLC was set up to encourage policy coordination among major 
donors, Israel, and the PA, while the LACC served as a forum for all donors and 
coordinated international funds on the ground. The LACC also liaised between the 
AHLC and Sector Working Groups. Sector Working Groups were set up in 1995 as a 
local forum for sector-based coordination and implementation of development projects. 
As the Oslo process progressed, Israeli imposed restrictions on movement and access 
increased, posing major impediments to donor-funded development project 
implementation. In 1997, the JLC specially created the Task Force on Project 
Implementation (TFPI) to determine ways to work around those constraints. The AHLC, 
CG, JLC, LACC, TFPI, and the Sector Working Groups were all co-chaired by 
international institutions (World Bank, UNSCO, EU/EC, US/USAID, Japan/JICA, 
Norway) and sometimes a PA representative.  
 The international institutional architecture and corresponding configurations of 
international and domestic elite social forces represented the penetration of international 
institutions and deeply embedded nature of international intervention in Palestine‟s 
development and conceptualization. The complex and extensive structures devised by the 
international community to fund, coordinate, and manage neoliberal development 
projects ensured Palestine‟s continued and deepening internationalization. Furthermore, 
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the international institutional architecture set up after Oslo became a space for 
international and domestic elite social forces to congregate and consolidate neoliberal 
hegemony in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation and development.        
 In addition, the World Bank and leading Palestinian actors created the Palestinian 
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) in 1993 as a 
mechanism for managing aid and investments, along with drafting economic policies.
84
 
PECDAR was created because there were no public financial institutions in the 
Palestinian territories that could manage and implement the development projects funded 
by donor aid. The transitional rubric that Oslo operated under applied to PECDAR as 
well in that its mandate was originally supposed to expire in 1996, yet still remains today. 
Several PA ministries emerged from PECDAR program offices such as the office of 
program formulation became the Ministry of Finance and the economic analysis office 
became the Ministry of Planning.
85
  
 Trust funds were also an important mechanism for channeling donor funds to the 
PA, but more importantly represented the unprecedented role the World Bank was 
willing to play in setting up neoliberal conditions in the Palestinian territories. Since the 
Palestinian territories are not a member country of the Bank, the Bank devised new 
institutional mechanisms that were extraordinary at the time and allowed the Bank to 
pursue neoliberal development projects on the ground. While numerous funds have been 
created since the Oslo process, the most important during that time was the Holst Fund 
(1994 – 2001), as it was the main way to channel funds to the development of PA 
institutions. The Holst Fund provided financing for three components of PA institutional 
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development: 1) recurrent budget support (initially only for a couple ministries but by 
1995 had broadened to include financing for almost all PA central administration salaries, 
operations and maintenance expenses), 2) job creation, and 3) micro-projects. The 
purpose of the Fund exemplified the way international donors were willing to fund 
institutional development to create an environment for capital accumulation and 
institutionalize a neoliberal conception of Palestine.    
 Through the various funding and implementation mechanisms discussed above, 
the PA was a product of international institutionalization of the neoliberal project in 
Palestinian governance and institution building. Prior to the Oslo process, public 
Palestinian institutions did not exist in the Palestinian territories, and during the Oslo 
process, Israel would only allow Palestinian institutional development within the context 
of a peace process (i.e. with international oversight and consent given by Israel).
86
 
Separation between the Gaza Strip and West Bank led to inefficiency and duplication of 
institutions and the complete disconnect from East Jerusalem prevented any cohesion in 
Palestinian national institutions. Because the PA was a construction of international 
institutions and was limited by external constraints of occupation, the Authority had 
limited policymaking capacity. As the PA was a creation of the international community, 
it expectedly was dependent on international institutions for policy formulation. 
Particularly, the PA was dependent on economic policies that would guide the pseudo-
state apparatus toward the domestic consolidation of hegemony with neoliberal values 
ensured by the social forces that were brought into the construction of the PA.    
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Industrial Estates  
 
 
All projects through international institutions enable an environment for neoliberal 
development in some fashion; however, the most glaring reflection during the Oslo 
process was the creation of a free zones and industrial estates program. Industrial estates 
and free zones are specially designated customs and duty-free, export-processing zones 
that aim to attract foreign investment and facilitate joint ventures. They facilitate capital 
accumulation by creating enclaves of small-scale investor friendly environments (low 
cost labor, tax exemptions, few environmental regulations, advanced infrastructure, etc.) 
that guarantee few protections for local workers and the environment, but promise profits 
for international and domestic elite social forces. In the Palestinian territories, the 
industrial estates program represented a larger dynamic in the relationship between 
international institutions and Palestinian state formation during the Oslo process. The 
industrial estates were important development projects for international institutions that 
tried to isolate political variables from economic variables because they were an attempt 
to create “closure-free zones.” The idea that development could proceed in isolated 
enclaves, while ignoring the larger political context of military occupation mimicked the 
larger thrust of international support for the Oslo process that ignored the necessity of a 
political process that would lead to a political settlement and a Palestinian state.  
 The economic justification for the development of industrial estates in the 
Palestinian territories was that they would solve the persistent problem of Palestinian 
unemployment, build confidence and mutual trust through economic linkages with Israeli 
businesses, and integrate the Palestinian economy into global markets. The “Law for 
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Industrial Estates and Free Zones” and the “Law on the Encouragement of Investment” 
provided the main legal framework for establishing industrial estates and made clear that 
all incentives, exemptions and privileges were offered to investors regardless of 
nationality. The industrial estates encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering 
financial incentives and exemptions such as: goods imported and exported, profits 
earned, and buildings constructed were all exempt from customs duties and taxes. Capital 
invested, income generated, and foreign currencies could all be freely transferred and 
repatriated to home countries.
87
   
 With the assistance of international institutions, particularly the World Bank, the 
Palestinian Industrial Estates and Free Zones Authority (PIEFZA) was created during the 
Oslo process, which allowed for a legal rubric for implementing industrial estates and 
free zones along the Green Line. PIEFZA managed the industrial estates and free zones 
program and provided “one stop shop” services for investors by coordinating all permits 
and licenses needed with relevant government agencies to begin production in the 
industrial estates. The entire concept of industrial estates and free zones in the Palestinian 
territories – where neoliberal policies and purported economic development could 
flourish in isolated enclaves permitted by Israel – further institutionalized the very nature 
of the Oslo Accords and the subsequent process that became infamous for cantonizaton 
and foreign control. 
 Before the Oslo process, Israel had established one industrial estate slightly north 
of the Gaza Strip called the Erez Industrial Estate (EIE). After the Oslo Accords were 
signed, the Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade, Natan Sharansky, and World Bank 
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President, James Wolfensohn, sought to revive and expand the industrial estates 
program.
88
 The GIE was the first and only operational industrial estate established during 
the Oslo process. The industrial estate was equipped with advanced infrastructure and 
service centers for conducting business. Nine other industrial estates were planned during 
the Oslo process, but none were launched during that time. Not coincidentally, the 
industrial estate was ceremonially opened in December 1998 when US President Bill 
Clinton visited the Gaza Strip. President Clinton cut the ribbon at the then standing Gaza 
Airport and US Commerce Secretary, William Daley, did the same at the GIE site.
89
 The 
primary investors (elite social forces) in the GIE were the World Bank, USAID, 
European Investment Bank, Palestine Development and Investment Ltd. (PADICO), and 
the government of Israel. USAID, whose main function is a procurement agency for US 
firms in the Palestinian territories, contracted a number of companies such as The 
Services Group (now AECOM International Development), The Berger Group, and 
Chemonics to design and build infrastructure and install high-tech scanners so that Israel 
would accept the goods as safe for export.
90
 Each of these private international 
development firms has development projects such as the construction of export 
processing zones in other “emerging markets.”   
 Industrial estates were an important mechanism for merging local social and 
economic forces led by the private sector in the Palestinian territories and Israel with the 
neoliberal ideological logic and international social forces of international institutions. 
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PADICO (among others) became representative of the new Palestinian elite social forces 
that were arranging themselves in the contested neoliberal process of conceptualizing 
Palestinian state formation.
91
 International estates also became “vehicles for transmitting 
the global market discipline to the domestic economy” and a space for international 
institutions to have influence over Palestinian economic relations with Israel and the rest 
of the world.
92
 They were packaged as a model for economic development and a conduit 
for Palestinian economic integration into the global economy, similar to export 
processing zones in other developing countries. Seen as “closure-proof,” the industrial 
estates and free zone program not only attempted to ignore the context of Israeli 
occupation, but further refashion the impediments of economic development as an 
opportunity to globalize.
93
 However, production in industrial estates was not for domestic 
consumption and as such had few linkages with the rest of the economy. They did not 
prove to be effective engines of economic growth as there were few “spillover” effects 
into the domestic Palestinian economy. Finally, industrial estates were quickly relegated 
from any notion of “closure proof” as the IDF frequently interfered with site development 
and imposed closure when the al-Aqsa intifada began in 2000.  
 
3.3 Summary 
 
 
The terms and structure of the Oslo Accords clearly favored Israel and its state 
expansionist goals through various mechanisms such as its unilateral right to impose 
closure over discountiguous Palestinian enclaves while simultaneously expanding its 
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population in Palestinian territories. Israel defends its right to prevent movement and 
access through the use of checkpoints or closure more generally in the name of temporary 
security measures, however, the regularity and extent of these mechanisms go far beyond 
justifiable security concerns. Since the Oslo process, movement and access restrictions 
have been widespread and consistent, thus representing an institutionalized policy of 
closure since that time. Furthermore, the CU and revenue-clearance system as part of the 
Paris Protocol privileged Israel‟s economy and made PA funding partly dependent on 
Israel‟s willingness to remit money back to the Palestinians. Israeli occupation was 
institutionalized during the Oslo process with the support of the international community 
and these dynamics created the context from which the current inviability of Palestinian 
statehood derives. While the aspirations for Oslo may have been in the spirit of 
Palestinian statehood, the political and economic architecture created under its auspices 
was pointed toward creating a business friendly environment and the conditions for 
neoliberal-based capital accumulation in the Palestinian territories.  
 While international institutions had been involved in the Palestinian territories 
before the 1990s, most significantly the UN and its related agencies, the Oslo process 
opened the door for international intervention into the Palestinian territories. Through 
policy prescriptions and donor-sponsored development projects, international institutions 
have ensured neoliberal values in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. Policy 
papers and recommendations encouraged the formulation of a policy framework that 
supported neoliberalism through good governance principals and market-based, investor-
friendly macroeconomic policies. Institutional development and corresponding policies 
provided a legal and regulatory context for tangible development projects on the ground 
51 
 
in the Palestinian territories. Most notably during the Oslo process, institutional 
development was supported through the burgeoning PA apparatus. Economic 
development was assisted through various programs during the Oslo process, although 
for purposes of this paper the establishment of an industrial estates and free zone program 
was the most noteworthy. This is because of the direct economic and ideological role 
they played in linking the neoliberal rules, practices, and norms of an emerging world 
order with those of Palestinian economic development. In this process, international and 
Palestinian social forces are brought together for the purpose of domestic consolidation of 
neoliberal values in the process of conceptualizing Palestine.  
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Chapter 4 – International Institutions in the Palestinian Territories in 
the Post-Oslo Period (2000 – Present) 
 
 
The Oslo process was problematic from the outset, as described in the previous chapter. 
During the Oslo process, international institutions made clear that Palestinian economic 
recovery was a three-pronged approach, whereby both Israel and the PA needed to make 
reform efforts, and the international community would support each in these endeavors. 
However, during the Oslo process, there was much emphasis on Palestinian institutional 
development and donor funding of what was considered vital projects for laying the 
foundations for conceptualizing neoliberal Palestinian state formation and economic 
integration into regional and global markets. During the Oslo process, international 
institutions tried to separate political and economic variables in hopes that economic 
development and a burgeoning PA apparatus would downplay the political and economic 
realities of Israeli occupation. Any hope surrounding the Oslo process, no matter how 
false it may have been, clearly had ended by the end of the decade. Negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinians failed in 2000 at Camp David and Taba, Ariel Sharon was 
elected Prime Minister in Israel, and Palestinians took to the streets in 2000 in rejection 
of the configuration of Palestine that favored Israeli state expansionism and neoliberal 
global integration.  
  When the second intifada started in 2000 the Israeli military redeployed into 
many villages and towns in the Palestinian territories, particularly since 2002 when the 
IDF conducted “Operation Defensive Shield” and entered Areas A and B. Since that 
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time, Israel controls all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
94
 Even after Israel‟s 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the IDF still retains complete control over 
its land, air, and sea, which has proven devastating since Israel‟s siege on the territory 
that began in 2007. Since 2000, international organizations have increasingly diverted 
funds from development to humanitarian relief. Between 2001 and 2006 developmental 
assistance comprised only a little more than a quarter of total donor assistance to the 
Palestinians.
95
 The ratio between development and humanitarian assistance was 7:1 
during the Oslo process, but by 2002, the ratio practically reversed to 1:5.
96
 During the 
second intifada donors nearly doubled aid, reaching approximately $1 billion annually.
97
  
 Since the PA was a construction and product of international intervention into 
Palestinian political development, donors have desperately attempted to prevent structural 
collapse of the PA and a humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories. Had either of 
these occurred, the negligent role of Israel and the international community in ending the 
conflict and implementing a political settlement that would lead to a Palestinian state 
would have been clearly illuminated. Mainly, international organizations provide 
humanitarian relief directly in the form of food or medical assistance or through budget 
support to PA institutions and short-term employment generation schemes (primarily 
within donor-funded neoliberal development projects).
98
 While international institutions 
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initially allowed for public sector employment expansion as a response to closure-
inflicted unproductive private sector unemployment, they have since reigned in on this 
practice. International institutions permitted this at first because it was easier than 
confronting Israel for creating the conditions under which massive unemployment was 
taking place. While international organizations now passively criticize Israel in their 
publications, more importantly they promote policies to the PA and condition funding on 
capping the public wage bill and other public sector reform measures. Following the 
neoliberal mantra and ignoring the conditions of occupation, the World Bank and other 
international institutions believe that support for the private sector can help the PA curtail 
a growing public sector.
99
  
In January 2006 when Hamas democratically won the PLC elections, the 
international community immediately boycotted the new Palestinian government by 
halting all aid and diplomatic contacts. Israel withheld clearance revenues that it was 
supposed to remit back to the PA as part of the Paris Protocol, amounting to a deficit over 
$1 billion.
 100
 Agreeing to the terms set by dominant international social forces and 
mutually agreeable to local elites, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas officiated an 
“emergency government” and declared Hamas an illegal authority on 17 June 2007. A 
month later, the emergency government was transformed into a “caretaker government” 
and was unequivocally supported by the international community. Salaam Fayyad, a US-
trained economist that previously worked at the World Bank and IMF was appointed 
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Prime Minister.
101
 Israel released 256 mostly-Fatah prisoners from Israeli jails, increased 
entry permits for senior PLO officials, and started to remit some of the clearance revenue 
back to the PA that it had been withholding as part of the Hamas boycott.
102
 The 
international denouncement of democratic results in the PLC elections showed once 
again the deeply embedded nature of the international community in shaping Palestinian 
political development and was yet another example of the marriage between international 
and domestic social forces in securing an internationally approved legal and regulatory 
environment for capital accumulation. Furthermore, the configuring of domestic and 
international social forces during this processes further concretized the role of 
international elite social forces in conceptualizing Palestine.  
 At the Paris Donors Conference held in December 2007, acting Prime Minister 
Salaam Fayyad presented the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for the 
years 2008 – 2010. In general, the PRDP sets out to “…reform the security sector and re-
establish the rule of law, improve access to justice, move toward a more fiscally 
sustainable position, improve our management of public finances, strengthen the capacity 
of the public sector, and improve local governance.”103 The PRDP embodies a 
comprehensive plan for neoliberal reform and development in the Palestinian territories 
on a sectoral basis, as prescribed by international institutions. The PRDP is a 
manifestation of Palestinian elite social forces negotiating the policies and ideology of 
neoliberal-influenced world order with the process of Palestinian state formation. 
According to the World Bank, “The PA‟s recognition of the need to interface with donors 
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is imbedded in the PRDP preparation process, whereby PA sub-teams were created on 
economic development, infrastructure, governance and social and humanitarian policy. 
The setup of these teams mirrors the structure of the Local Strategy Groups,” which is 
coordinated by LACS through the AHLC and Quartet.
104
     
 The PRDP economic and development policy framework represents a complete 
embracement of what dominant international social forces expect from a Palestinian 
government, despite its limited capabilities and resources. In creating the PRDP, the PA 
stated that it held consultations with “internal stakeholders” such as the private sector and 
NGOs, in addition to “external development partners” such as international financial 
institutions and donors.
105
 The PRDP approach is based on neoliberal economic 
principals and standardized with international institutional formats. For example, the 
PRDP utilizes a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), as developed by the 
World Bank and a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework created by UNCTAD.
106
 Similar to 
most plans in the post-Oslo period, the PRDP is a performance based-plan with built in 
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.
107
  
 Much of the PRDP is about public expenditure control and PA fiscal 
sustainability, an attempt to “slim down the PNA.”108 Complying with neoliberal dictates, 
the PRDP promises to reduce the budget deficit, control the public sector wage bill, 
reduce public sector employment, reform the pension system in the future, privatize 
electricity distribution, improve public financial management, implement modern human 
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resources management thru performance evaluations and merit-based appointments, and 
introduce e-government. The PRDP embraces nearly all the policy recommendations 
proffered by international institutions in the Oslo and post-Oslo periods. For instance it 
says the PA will draft a Company Law, Competition Law, Land Law, Industrial Law, 
Trade Law, Public Audit Law, Civil Service Law, revise the Public Finance Law, revise 
the Landlord and Tenant Law, upgrade capacity of data collecting bodies (PCBS, MoF, 
MoP), build capacity of the Palestinian Standards Institute (PSI), establish an electricity 
regulatory body, develop the mortgage market, increase property registration, increase 
exports, create an agro-industrial park (described below), establish municipal industrial 
parks in Tulkarem and Hebron, and establish border industrial estates in Jenin and 
Tarqumiya (described below) – all of which have been previously recommended to the 
PA by international institutions.
109
  
 Not surprisingly, international institutions support the PA‟s drive to implement a 
neoliberal policy framework and believe the PA has done a remarkable job at 
implementing a number of the PRDP reforms.
 110
 Elite social forces that have been built 
up through the PA (MoP and MoF in particular through pioneering of PRDP) admit, 
“Reformers have difficulty countering the allegations that the reform agenda is 
international, not Palestinian, lending credence to one of the most powerful arguments 
advanced by resistors of reform.”111 The PRDP is a clear manifestation of domestic social 
forces agreeing to terms set by international elite social forces and mutually agreeable to 
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both groups for establishing a business friendly climate conducive to neoliberal capital 
accumulation in the Palestinian territories.   
 
4.2.1 Policy Recommendations  
 
 
The tone of policy recommendations after the Oslo process varied little from the earlier 
period. The general thrust toward the neoliberal condition remained the same as the 
World Bank reiterated in the post-Oslo period, “Palestinian economic recovery will 
depend on creating an export-based economy with unimpeded access to global 
markets.”112 Not unlike the Oslo period, the post-Oslo phase has been heavily influenced 
by policy recommendations of international institutions. Enhancing institutional capacity 
to correspond more correctly with a neoliberal project continues to be a major policy 
emphasis for international institutions. One World Bank publication notes, “Without 
efficient customs, courts, standards institutes, statistical services and other necessary 
institutions, the Palestinian private sector will not be competitive.” International 
institutions prescribe the development of key institutions that promote trade such as the 
Department of Customs, which according to the World Bank, needs support in entering 
the World Customs Organization.
 113
 International institutions also recommend 
establishment of the Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC), enhancing the 
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA), and creating a credit bureau to further develop 
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the legal and regulatory environment and favorable neoliberal conditions in the 
Palestinian territories.
114
  
 While a number of ministries work directly with particular international 
institutions on drafting general policies, certain laws have been consistently prescribed in 
the post-Oslo period. Similar to aiding key institutions that support trade and investment, 
the laws that international institutions recommend foster a legal framework for 
neoliberal-based capital accumulation. This includes establishing competition and anti-
money laundering laws, and reforming the existing electricity and pension laws to 
decrease the amount of public assistance.
 115 
 Privatization is encouraged through 
contractual arrangements for private management and investment in power distribution 
utilities. To harmonize Palestinian procedures and products with existing practices and 
rules in neoliberal influenced emerging world order international institutions recommend 
the development of the PSI to meet international standards. All PA manuals and 
procedures are also encouraged to become standardized with international norms.
116
 The 
largest change from international institutions in the post-Oslo period has not been in the 
prescriptions themselves, but that international institutions started to condition 
international assistance to Palestinians on reform towards those recommendations. In 
2000 and 2002, the IMF was mandated by donors to provide assistance to the PA through 
a range of reforms in the Economic Policy Framework and the Transparency and 
Financial Accountability Support Group. More recently, the IMF works with the PA in 
creating its annual budget and monitoring public sector expenditure. President Bush‟s 
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Rose Garden speech in 2002 made Palestinian statehood conditional on the PA‟s ability 
to strengthen governance capacity and increase fiscal transparency. During this time, the 
Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR) was created to implement, monitor, and 
evaluate Palestinian performance towards international recommended/imposed 
reforms.
117
 These reforms were further embodied in the 2003 Quartet sponsored 
“Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict.”  
 A smaller, although also apparent, change in international institutions in the post-
Oslo period appears in their critique of Israel‟s role in preventing Palestinian economic 
development. The World Bank, for example, has repeatedly stated that Israeli imposed 
movement and access restrictions “…go beyond concrete and checkpoints to [form] a 
complex matrix of restrictive policies and administrative procedures that combine to stunt 
Palestinian economic growth.” 118  Statements that identify Israeli obstacles to Palestinian 
economic development and the accompanying recommendations for removing these 
barriers remain baseless and decontextualized as they fall short of actually pressing Israel 
to change. No aid to Israel has been conditioned on these recommendations or support for 
agreements with the PLO. The context of Israeli occupation and necessary Israeli steps 
for improving the situation remain in publications of international organizations that 
focus on the Palestinian territories and not in the publications for Israel. In this way, there 
is a disconnect between what employees of international organizations know based on 
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realities on the ground and their ability to actually affect the structural dislocations in the 
Palestinian economy.
119
  
   
4.2.2 Development Projects 
 
 
Similar to the Oslo phase, development projects for Palestinians sought to align more 
directly development activities with those of neoliberalism so that these values would 
become incorporated into the conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. The logic 
behind the developmental framework did not change significantly in the post-Oslo phase. 
Good governance and other neoliberal prescriptions are encouraged through institutional 
development by building and strengthening technical, management, and administrative 
capabilities. Poverty is purportedly reduced by expanding access to productive assets, 
employment is generated through labor intensive, private-sector development, 
infrastructure is developed and improved to “increase the livelihood capacity” of 
Palestinians and for the facilitation of trade and communications into global markets.
 120
 
UNDP, for example, still has the same main focuses as the earlier period of 1) poverty 
reduction through economic development and growth and 2) enhancing governance 
institutions.
121
 As part of it governance development program, UNDP supports 
“constructing courthouses and detention centers” in concretizing the neoliberal rule of 
law and resolving conflicts through the (neo) liberal state.  
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 Development projects since the Oslo phase have tried to address some of the 
criticisms of neoliberal development by making development packages appear more 
participatory and locally oriented. UNDP, for example, notes that many of its 
development programs “are developed from a participatory community-based 
prioritization of local needs approach.”122 The World Bank connects gender to the 
protection of private property. They state, “Although shari‟a law allows women to inherit 
land, this is rarely practiced due to the fear of women to claim their land rights. Often 
they forgo these rights in order to preserve harmony within the family. Such 
discriminatory social practices will persist unless a standard legal system is established to 
protect the land rights of all people.”123 On the surface these development programs 
appear to be more participatory; however, even the World Bank admits that international 
aid to Palestinians is highly motivated by donors‟ political views and has “created a 
„shopping list‟ approach to development planning where projects are more aligned with 
the donor‟s requirements than with local priorities.”124 Moreover, the ends remain the 
same in neoliberal-based development programs – that of ensuring a stable environment 
for business and capital accumulation – despite some the means to these ends changing in 
emphasis to particular segments of the population.  
 
Donors, Funding, and Aid Coordination 
 
Despite minor changes, the international institutional architecture that coordinates and 
manages aid to the Palestinian territories varies little from the Oslo period. The AHLC 
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approved a number of changes in aid coordination and management on 14 December 
2005. Currently, Norway is the chair of the AHLC, the EU and US are the co-sponsors, 
and the World Bank serves as secretariat. At the capital level, the Quartet was given a 
formal place in the aid coordination hierarchy, serving as an adjunct to the AHLC on 
political matters. At the local level, the Local Development Forum (LDF) was 
established, which replaced the LACC, along with the Humanitarian and Emergency 
Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Task Force for Palestinian Reform (LTFPR) that 
were created in 2002. The LDF is open to PA representatives, donors, development 
agencies, and a representative of Association of International Development Agencies 
(AIDA). The LDF supervises aid and international support issues and is co-chaired by the 
Palestinian Ministry of Planning, Norway, the World Bank, and UNSCO.
125
 The JLC was 
dissolved in 2005 and then reinstated in September 2008, although aid coordination staff 
of international organizations does not believe it will last long due to continuous political 
instability.
126
 
 Between 2002 – 2005, the TFPR and seven Reform Support Groups (RSGs) were 
established to specifically monitor and implement reform of PA institutions. The Civil 
Society RSG was coordinated by Norway, Elections were coordinated by the EC and the 
US, Financial Accountability was coordinated by the EC and the IMF, Judicial and Rule 
of Law Reform was coordinated by EC and the Netherlands, Market Economics was 
coordinated by the US and the World Bank, Local Government was coordinated by 
Japan, and Public Administration and Civil Service Reform was coordinated by 
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Germany, the World Bank, and the UK. Through these mechanisms international 
institutions have a direct link to local institutions and can ensure institutional 
development in the Palestinian territories is consistent with the norms and practices of an 
emerging neoliberal world order.    
 In 2005, the RSGs and The Sector Working Groups were consolidated into four 
Strategy Groups (SGs): economic, governance, infrastructure, and social development. 
Each of the SGs are chaired by a Palestinian ministry and an international actor and 
consist of a number of sector working groups, which are also co-headed by a Palestinian 
ministry and international representative. The Economic Strategy Group is co-chaired by 
the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, the Governance Strategy Group is co-
chaired by the Ministry of Planning and the EC, the Infrastructure Strategy Group is co-
chaired by the Ministry of Housing and Pubic Works and USAID, and the Social 
Development Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
UNSCO. Funds and projects are coordinated through the Local Aid Coordination 
Secretariat (LACS) and the Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI). Together the 
LACS and TFPI work with sector-based strategy groups to implement neoliberal 
development projects on the ground.
127
 As in the Oslo period, the expansive breadth of 
international structures and social forces represents how deeply intertwined international 
institutions are in Palestine‟s conceptualization and development. The neoliberal 
condition in Palestine is developing with the direct assistance of international institutions, 
which bring together international and domestic elite social forces in various arenas to 
consolidate hegemony and a neoliberal conceptualization of Palestine.  
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  The power and price of such internationalization was showcased when the 
international community boycotted the democratic election of Hamas to the PLC in 
January 2006 and froze nearly all international assistance to the PA at that time. In 
coordination with the World Bank, the EU formed a Temporary International Mechanism 
(TIM) as a way to bypass PA institutions (temporary administered by Hamas) while 
continuing to channel funds to neoliberal development projects and humanitarian relief in 
the Palestinian territories. The EU TIM closely monitored funds and beneficiaries to 
ensure that international assistance was only directed to those approved by international 
donors. In 2008, the EU TIM was replaced with the Palestino-Européen de Gestion et 
d'Aide Socio-Economique (PEGASE) mechanism, which is a longer-term instrument that 
allows for continued monitoring and evaluation of international funds to the Palestinian 
territories, but follows the timeline and framework of the internationally approved PRDP.  
 As in the Oslo period, World Bank Trust Funds play a large role in providing 
institutional mechanisms for donors to channel international assistance to development 
projects and humanitarian assistance in the Palestinian territories in the post-Oslo period. 
Most notable is the PRDP Trust Fund, as it follows a similar thrust as PEGASE in using 
the PRDP as the framework for financing. PRDP Trust funding is conditional upon 
successful implementation of reforms as set out in the PRDP. While the entire PRDP 
exemplifies Palestinian social forces presenting terms that are mutually agreeable to 
international institutions through a neoliberal framework, the PRDP TF specially targets 
political development through good governance within the PA as prescribed by 
international institutions. According to the World Bank, “Key policy items include 
expenditure containment (particularly wages and net lending) and progressive 
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strengthening of public finance management…”128 Also similar to the PEGASE 
mechanism, the PRDP TF guarantees thorough monitoring and evaluation of budget 
allocation and progress toward PRDP implementation. Funds are dispersed upon 
successful evaluation of PA quarterly reports by the World Bank and IMF.
129
 Through 
aid coordination structures and various funding mechanisms international institutions 
ensure neoliberal development programs continue in the Palestinian territories and 
provide an opportunity for elite international and domestic social forces to collaborate on 
the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in the conceptualization of Palestinian state 
formation.       
 
Industrial Estates  
 
 
When the second intifada started in 2000, construction of all proposed industrial estates 
was halted. Despite the complete failure of the industrial estates program during the Oslo 
process, certain social forces keen on creating small enclaves for limited capitalist 
accumulation and integration in regional and global markets seek to revitalize and expand 
the program. In a World Bank Technical Paper on industrial estates (IEs) in 2004, the 
Bank says,  
“In an improved operating environment, Palestinian entrepreneurs and foreign 
investors will look for well serviced industrial lands and supporting infrastructure. 
They will also seek a regulatory regime with a minimum of „red tape‟ and with 
clear procedures for conducting business. Industrial estates, particularly those on 
the border between Palestinian and Israeli territory, can fulfill this need and 
thereby play an important role in supporting export-based growth.”130  
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Four estates were proposed for revitalization or creation: EIE, GIE, Jenin (JIE), and 
Tarqumiya (TIE). In addition, there is potential for a Tulkarem Peace Park (TPP), which 
is favored by the Israeli and Palestinian private sectors because of its proximity to the 
Israeli high tech corridor around Herzliya. Tulkarem was also the site of connection 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Oslo process, which is important to 
investors should the possibility arise again for connection between the Palestinian 
territories. According to World Bank, these sites are considered feasible because of their 
locations to Israeli ports (Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Haifa), land availability, and potential 
for movement of goods and people.
131
 The World Bank makes five recommendations for 
the success of the industrial estates and free zones program.
132
 This includes, unfettered 
access and movement of goods, linkages with Israeli businesses and markets, use of IEs 
to increase exports, support for PIEFZA, PIEDCO, and other Palestinian private 
development groups (Palestinian elite social forces), and an agreed protocol between 
Israel and the Palestinians that would enable investors to utilize fully the IEs. In a 
meeting held in Jerusalem on 30 March 2008 between US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Prime Minister Salaam 
Fayyad, revival of the industrial estates and free zones program was a major topic for 
discussion.
133
    
 A  number of problems exist with these particular industrial estates in addition to 
the larger problems posed by export-processing zones in general in developing countries. 
TIE, for example, lies within Area C, which Israel directly controls. This is considered a 
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Palestinian development project of which Palestinians have no control. To construct the 
JIE, Palestinian farmland was confiscated in 1998 when the idea was originally 
envisioned, and again in 2003 when the Israeli military seized the land for the separation 
wall
134
 While the TPP is close to Israel‟s high tech corridor, it also lies within the “seam 
zone” created as a result of Israel‟s separation wall. 135 The wall and all areas confiscated 
by Israel for its construction was deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice in 
2004, which effectively makes the wall and all economic activities illegal under 
international law in those areas.
136
 It is unclear what legal ramifications this will have for 
Israel in the future or any business operating within those areas. 
 One of the saddest realities of the industrial estates and free zone program is that 
Karni Crossing, the site of the GIE, has become the only crossing for goods in and out of 
the Gaza Strip, whether they are going to the GIE or not.
137
 The GIE in particular, and 
industrial estates in general reinforce colonial practices imprinted on the process of 
Palestinian state formation and neoliberal economic integration into regional and global 
markets. Industrial estates and the free zone program are propped up as economic 
development opportunities for the Palestinian economy and the Palestinian private sector 
in particular, but the entire scheme embodies international elite social forces through the 
form of Israel and international institutions working with Palestinian elite social forces in 
the pursuit of personal capital accumulation. Together, these social forces configure the 
process of conceptualizing Palestine to the norms of an emerging neoliberal world order.  
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Agro-Industrial Park in the Jordan Valley  
 
 
The proposed agro-industrial park in the Jericho area of the southern West Bank is part of 
several development schemes for the Jordan Valley. On the local level, it is part of 
JICA‟s Jericho and Jordan Valley Development Program that includes three sector-based 
subprograms: governance, tourism, and agriculture. The agro-industrial park is also part 
of JICA‟s regional development plan called the Corridor for Peace and Prosperity, 
originally proposed in 2006 and aims to bring Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians 
together for agricultural development and water management.
138
 More recently, the agro-
industrial park idea has also been subsumed within the Valley of Peace initiative that has 
been supported by Israeli President Shimon Peres and officially agreed to in 2007 by 
Israel, Jordan, Japan, and the PA. The Valley of Peace plan integrates several 
development projects including the JIE and the agro-industrial park in the Jericho area. 
More recently, Quartet Representative Tony Blair has endorsed a number of “Quick 
Impact Projects” of which the JIE, TIE, and the agro-industrial park in the Jericho area 
are all part.
139
     
 Similar to industrial estates, the concept of an agro-industrial park in the Jordan 
Valley seeks to bring together international and domestic social forces to implement 
neoliberal development projects in the Palestinian territories. Specifically, JICA and other 
international institutions aim to develop and expand agribusiness in the Jordan Valley, 
which would allow a small amount of elite social forces to profit off the seasonal 
advantage of the area and its untapped potential in the Gulf and European markets. The 
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agro-industrial park would be a free-trade agricultural zone, where production of 
agricultural commodities would be geared toward export markets. The agro-industrial 
park would also be a facility where food processing would take place, from which 
processed foods could also be exported to regional and global markets.      
The stated purpose of the park is to generate investment, create jobs, and stimulate 
agricultural and industrial development for producing competitive Palestinian products. 
The Jordan Valley contains some of Palestine‟s most fertile land that has produced a 
majority of Palestinian agriculture; however, Israel has confiscated much of this land for 
settlements or closed military zones. Many Palestinian famers that have been 
dispossessed of their lands have little choice other than becoming agricultural workers in 
settlement-based agribusinesses. Rather than supporting local Palestinian social forces in 
developing their own farms and productive capacity, JICA and other international 
institutions have chosen instead to support a neoliberal form of agriculture in the Jordan 
Valley. This will likely provides few options for dispossessed Palestinian famers, but will 
be yet another arena for international and domestic elite social forces to collaborate in 
configuring and conceptualizing a neoliberal vision of Palestine.   
 
4.3 Summary 
 
 
The post-Oslo period is permeated with the effects of the Oslo process, resulting in 
worsening conditions for Palestinians and an intensification of the effects of international 
institutions in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. Israel has clearly proven that it 
retains full control of Palestinian territories in its re-occupation of areas where 
Palestinians were allowed a limited amount of “self-rule” under the auspices of the Oslo 
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Accords. To prevent a humanitarian crisis and collapse of the PA, the international 
community has poured more funds into the Palestinian territories than during the Oslo 
process. While humanitarian aid is increasing, development aid is decreasing and 
becoming progressively more conditioned on the PA‟s ability to implement successfully 
neoliberal reforms. Concomitantly, the Palestinian economy is becoming more dependent 
on international funding and elite Palestinian social forces are becoming more deeply 
integrated into a neoliberal notion of state formation.    
 Palestinians were reminded how salient their governance structures were to 
international intervention when the international community boycotted the democratically 
elected government of the Palestinian people in January 2006. Funding to neoliberal 
development programs continued albeit in ways that bypassed Hamas and rather 
supported Palestinian social forces that were more agreeable to the neoliberal agenda in 
an emerging world order. The eventual caretaker government and its PRDP reassured 
international social forces that elite Palestinian social forces are capable of establishing 
the neoliberal condition in Palestine and any conceptualization of state formation. 
 Policy recommendations are not greatly divergent from the Oslo process in that 
neoliberal national structuring is the policy framework. Building and enhancing 
institutional capacity along with harmonizing Palestinian standards with international 
standards are policy priorities to establish the legal and regulatory framework necessary 
for capital accumulation.  The importance of these policies is enforced through aid 
conditioning, which increasingly ties Palestinian institutional and policy reform with aid 
disbursements. Also in the post-Oslo period, international institutions have started to 
criticize Israel for imposing movement and access restrictions throughout the Palestinian 
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territories, particularly through closure. However, these critical evaluations remain 
decontextualized and the primary focus remains on the PA‟s ability to successfully 
implement neoliberal reforms.   
 Development projects follow a similar logic now as in the Oslo process. 
Developing institutional capacity, the private sector, infrastructure, and natural resources 
are major sectoral priorities for neoliberal development in the Palestinian territories. 
International funding for these projects is coordinated through a slightly modified 
structure remaining from the Oslo period. The Quartet has been added at the capital level 
while on the local level, the JLC exists intermittently and local sector working groups 
have been condensed. International institutions remain active at each level of aid 
coordination, management, and implementation, which ensures direct access to many 
Palestinian institutions and funding for internationally approved neoliberal development 
programs. The industrial estates development project was initially halted after the second 
intifada began, however, international and certain Palestinian social forces seek to 
reestablish the program as an engine for economic growth and integration into new 
regional and world markets. In addition, an agro-industrial park is being planned in the 
Jericho area. Similar to the industrial estates program, the agro-industrial park seeks to 
create an agricultural free-trade zone by expanding agribusiness and producing 
agriculture for export. Both the industrial estates and the agro-industrial park represent 
the configuring of elite international and domestic social forces working towards the 
consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestine.  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
 
There is a consensus among international institutions and other international social forces 
about the conceptualization of a Palestinian state. Within this scheme, the political and 
economic structures and processes should be congruent with international norms toward 
neoliberalism. The recommendations and logic embodied in international institutions are 
guided by principals that are engineered within the capitalist development framework as 
designed by advanced, wealthy states and non-state elite social forces. To this end, the 
proposed Palestinian state is supported, at least in theory, by every international 
organization working in the Palestinian territories. This should not be confused with the 
necessary negotiating of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Instead, what has clearly been implemented in the Palestinian territories is an ideology 
surrounding the “proper” way an emerging state should politically and economically 
develop. This means that local Palestinian social forces should embrace neoliberal values 
in consolidating national hegemony and integrate into an emerging world order.  
 International institutions configure Palestine in two main ways. First, the 
international community is complicit in Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands by 
supporting imbalanced international agreements that clearly favor an industrialized 
sovereign state over dispossessed native peoples and their claims to statehood. Israeli 
domination of Palestinians through military occupation was institutionalized during the 
Oslo process in the unequal nature and terms of the Accords. Designating certain “Areas” 
in Palestinian territories to be controlled by varying degrees of Palestinians and Israelis 
while concomitantly providing a pseudo-legal classification for Israeli settlements and 
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their so-called natural growth in Palestinian territories implicitly showed international 
acceptance for Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, which has led to de facto 
fragmentation and deepening of Palestinian dislocation.  
 In addition, the Paris Protocol as stipulated in the Oslo Accords heavily skewed 
trade, monetary, and fiscal policy in favor of Israel‟s already industrialized and protected 
economy. Institutionalization of closure in and around Palestinian areas that was set out 
in the Accords and in the process more generally has completely crippled the Palestinian 
economy and prevented any hopes for a viable economy in a potential Palestinian state. 
Because Palestinians were granted very little space to develop independently during the 
Oslo period, the process institutionalized the current context from which inviability of a 
potential Palestinian state derives. The more recent Roadmap to Peace embodies a similar 
thrust and has yet to produce an independent, viable Palestinian state.   
 International institutions also configure Palestine by ensuring neoliberal values in 
conceptualizing a potential state through policy recommendations and development 
projects. While international organizations had operated in the Palestinian territories prior 
to the 1990s, the Oslo process presented an opportunity for increased international 
intervention into the Palestinian state building project. The World Bank and IMF were 
prolific in developing key PA institutions and their corresponding policies that aimed to 
create the correct legal and regulatory conditions for a neoliberal based, business-friendly 
environment for capital accumulation. Policy prescriptions vary little from the Oslo phase 
thru the post-Oslo period in that national structuring along neoliberal tenants of 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization were underscored. Particularly, trade 
liberalization, private sector investment, and public sector management through good 
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governance principals were major areas of policy emphasis for international institutions 
during the Oslo process.   
 Development projects during that time worked in collaboration with policy 
prescriptions to structure the conditions in Palestine along neoliberal lines. International 
institutions largely supported the development of the PA to create public institutions that 
would foster an investor friendly climate conducive to capital accumulation in the 
Palestinian territories. This created a mechanism for domestic and international social 
forces to consolidate neoliberal hegemony. Although all development projects during the 
Oslo process supported the configuration of social forces for national neoliberal 
structuring, the most evident was the Industrial Estates and Free Zones program. In an 
attempt to separate economic and political variables through supposed “closure-proof” 
enclaves, international institutions supported the development of export-processing zones 
along the Green Line. Although ten industrial estates were promoted during the Oslo 
process, the GIE was the only one to open its doors. International institutions played a 
key role in conceptualizing and advancing the industrial estates through financial and 
technical support.   
 During the Oslo process, the international community devised complex aid 
coordination mechanisms to manage and implement donor funds. Elite social forces 
through international institutions and foreign states were active at each level. At the 
international level, the establishment of the AHLC, which still exists today, and the CG 
formulated the overall aid strategy in the Palestinian territories. Beneath this level, the 
JLC, LACC, and TFPI coordinated international funding. The LACC liaised between the 
AHLC and Sector Working Groups, which were also co-chaired with international social 
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forces. World Bank trust funds were important mechanisms for channeling funds to 
neoliberal development projects during the Oslo period, particularly the Holst Fund as it 
provided the startup costs associated with establishing PA institutions. Additionally, the 
creation of PECDAR, which subsequently produced both the Ministry of Planning and 
the Ministry of Finance, has had a lasting effect in drafting PA policies. The compilation 
and complexity of these structures and processes has ensured a place for international 
institutions in defining Palestine and its development.   
 Taken together, the nature and terms of the Oslo Accords, policy prescriptions, 
and development projects during the Oslo process proved that international institutions 
play a major role in shaping the neoliberal condition and conceptualization of Palestine. 
The Oslo process set the foundation for international involvement in these processes. 
International institutions have continued and expanded in this capacity in the post-Oslo 
period, where change is mostly in emphasis rather than a change of course that could help 
Palestinians build a viable state in the near future. 
 In the post-Oslo period, the negative, lasting effects of the Oslo process became 
blatantly clear as Israel proved it retained ultimate control over Palestinian territories and 
the international community severely punished the Palestinians for exercising their 
democratic rights in the 2006 PLC elections. Shortly after the start of the al-Aqsa intifada 
in 2000, Israel redeployed its military into all Palestinian territories, even those that had 
been grated limited Palestinian autonomy under the Oslo Accords. International 
institutions have provided immense amounts of humanitarian relief to Palestinians in the 
post-Oslo phase to prevent starvation among Palestinians and the collapse of the PA; 
however, the international community boycotted the Hamas-elected government in 2006 
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and insisted on a government more amicable to neoliberal configuring. The caretaker 
government embodies elite Palestinian political and economic social forces collaborating 
with international institutions through terms that are mutually agreeable to ensure an 
environment for domestic and international capital accumulation. The recent PRDP is a 
glaring example of elite Palestinian social forces regurgitating the edicts of neoliberal 
development toward Palestinian state formation.  
 The objectives of policy prescriptions and developments projects varied little 
between the Oslo process and the post-Oslo period, rather differences lie in prioritization 
and fund allocation. To stave off a major humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories, 
the international community has continually provided food and medical aid to 
Palestinians, shifting international donor assistance from development towards 
humanitarian relief in the post-Oslo phase. Policy recommendations followed a similar 
thrust as those during the Oslo process, although international institutions became more 
rigorous in pushing Palestinian neoliberal reform and structuring. Since the Oslo process, 
there has been an increased emphasis on PA institutions and policies becoming more 
aligned with neoliberal rules and practices in an emerging world order. To ensure that the 
PA specifically, and Palestinian state formation more generally, follows a neoliberal path 
the international community has started to condition international assistance on 
successful implementation of the neoliberal reform agenda.  
 Similarly, donor-funded development projects did not change significantly in 
terms of content in the post-Oslo phase. Some development projects purport to include 
more local ownership in planning and implementation; however, this indicates an 
integration of domestic and international social forces on terms that are mutually 
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agreeable, rather than locally driven and supported development. In the post-Oslo period, 
the industrial estates program has been rejuvenated and seeks to develop more export-
processing zones in Palestinian territories. While export-processing zones have been 
criticized for their inability to produce spillover effects and economic linkages in the 
domestic economies that house them, the proposed industrial estates in the Palestinian 
territories pose specific problems for Palestinian economic development. Each of the 
proposed industrial estates lies in legally problematic areas and/or on lands that was 
directly confiscated from Palestinian farmers. In Gaza, the Karni Crossing that contains 
the GIE has become a direct symbol of Israeli occupation and siege as it has become the 
only crossing allowed by Israel for export or imports into the coastal region. The agro-
industrial park planned in the Jordan Valley also seeks to expand neoliberal development 
through the creation of an agricultural free-trade zone that would support agribusiness 
and integrate Palestinian agriculture into regional and global markets.     
 The complicated international aid architecture that was invoked during the Oslo 
process was slightly amended in 2005 to include the Quartet at the international level and 
consolidation of aid coordination groups on the local level. International institutions 
remained active at every stage and played an even greater role once the international 
community boycotted the democratic election results in the 2006 PLC elections. The EU 
TIM, the more recent PEGASE, and the  World Bank PRDP TF channel funds to 
Palestinian social forces that agree to follow internationally directed neoliberal rules and 
norms, and are willing to work toward the configuration of social forces that consolidate 
neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. All these funding 
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mechanisms condition funding on implementing neoliberal reforms in the Palestinian 
territories.    
 The neoliberal values that international institutions have encouraged through 
policy recommendations and development projects do not create a Palestinian state, 
rather they are mechanisms for ensuring the ideological route for Palestine, whatever the 
shape. In this way, international institutions have supported agreements, policies, and 
development projects that all have been counterproductive to the necessary political 
engagement that is needed to form a Palestinian state. Aid and neoliberal values cannot 
substitute for the political process necessary to bring an end to the conflict and justice to 
Palestinians. 
 Even if Palestinians were granted a state to the ends promoted by international 
institutions and other social forces that celebrate neoliberal development, it is clear this 
process would be problematic in the least and would certainly not amount to the 
liberation Palestinians are seeking after decades of occupation. Supporting Palestinian 
self-determination requires a political process that results in a political settlement for 
Palestinians. Until that time comes, Palestine‟s internationalization will continue to 
intensify by international and domestic elite social forces configuring the neoliberal 
condition into the conceptualization of Palestine.  
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